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Abstract
The effects of the Great Recession on housing equity and homeownership have been well-docu-
mented. However, we know little about how rental households fared and the efficacy of housing
subsidies in addressing affordability gaps. This paper examines the extent to which rental housing
became less affordable for Extremely Low-Income (ELI) households – those earning less than
30% of the Area Median Income (AMI). I then run regression models to determine the local char-
acteristics most strongly associated with larger affordability gaps, with a focus on whether hous-
ing subsidies are effective at combating such gaps. Rental affordability gaps became more
pronounced during the Great Recession. In nearly 70% of the counties in my sample, there was
an increase from 2007 to 2010 in the number of ELI households per affordable rental unit. Across
the country, the increase was 17%, a dramatic increase in only three years. There is considerable
variation across the country, with acute affordability crises often concentrated in the South, par-
ticularly Florida. Regression models provide compelling evidence that housing vouchers, public
housing, and project-based Section 8 subsidies play an important role in limiting the extent to
which large numbers of ELI households are competing for a shortage of low-cost rental units.
However, these programmes do not respond quickly to local needs – such as those brought
about by the Great Recession. A pilot study where local housing authorities had funding to be
more agile and responsive would be an important step toward crafting better policy.
Keywords
housing affordability, housing subsidies, poverty, public housing, recession
Received August 2015; accepted December 2016
Introduction
The Great Recession caused a substantial
upheaval for Americans across the income
spectrum. Those with housing equity were
hit particularly hard and the declines in
housing wealth – particularly between 2007
and 2010 – have been well-documented.
What is less discussed is the effects on renters
who, on average, experienced declines in
income because of massive unemployment.
Further, in many markets, the foreclosure
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and credit crises contributed to increased
demand for rental housing, as foreclosed
homeowners began to rent and fewer house-
holds became homeowners. As a result, ren-
ters had more competition for rental housing
and less money to pay for it.
This paper analyses the state of rental
markets before and after the Great
Recession in the USA. Specifically, I exam-
ine the extent to which rental housing
became less affordable for Extremely Low-
Income (ELI) households. ELI households
are defined by the US Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
as earning less than 30% of the Area
Median Income (AMI) and are the primary
target population for rental housing subsidy
programmes. I then run models to determine
the metropolitan area housing market and
economic characteristics most strongly asso-
ciated with larger affordability gaps before
and after the Great Recession. Prior
research has examined the determinants of
metropolitan house prices (Abraham and
Hendershott, 1992; Capozza et al., 2002;
Goodman, 1988). This paper will identify
locations with the starkest rental affordabil-
ity gaps and whether housing subsidies are
effective at reducing such gaps.
Nationwide, it is clear that rental afford-
ability gaps became more pronounced during
the Great Recession. In nearly 70% of the
536 largest counties in the country, there was
an increase from 2007 to 20101 in the number
of ELI households per affordable rental unit.
Across the country, the increase was 17%, a
dramatic increase in only three years.
Not surprisingly, the data show wide var-
iation across the country in housing afford-
ability gaps, but some of this variation
comes in unexpected places. Affordability
problems were clearly greater along the
coasts – particularly in Florida, which has a
stronger confluence of poverty and high
housing costs than virtually anywhere else in
the country. But counties and metropolitan
areas elsewhere in the South also had very
high affordability problems. This is driven
in part by the high poverty rates in these
areas, but the affordability measures in this
paper account for Area Median Income,
meaning high poverty rates are not the
only factor – housing costs clearly play a
role as well.
The measures in this paper are designed
to reflect housing subsidy demand – the
more households competing for each unit of
low-priced rental housing, the greater the
demand for housing subsidies. The regres-
sion models provide suggestive evidence that
public housing and housing vouchers may
play a role in reducing the number of ELI
households competing for low-cost rental
units. In the cross-sectional models, public
housing and Section 8 New Construction
(2007 and 2010) and vouchers (2010 model
only) are strongly associated with lower com-
petition for low-cost housing units for
extremely low-income households. Using
panel data, housing vouchers have the
same association, but not public housing or
Section 8 New Construction. I hypothesise
that a housing subsidy policy that responded
to needs would allow us to more definitively
assess the role that these subsidies can play in
shielding low-income and extremely low-
income households from severe rent burdens.
Housing affordability and the
Great Recession
Poverty increased dramatically during the
Great Recession. From 2006 to 2010, the
number of Americans living in poverty grew
27% (36.5 to 46.2 million), more than
eight times the US population increase over
that time (Seefeldt and Graham, 2013).
Furthermore, the rate of deep poverty –
those living in households with incomes
below half of the poverty line – was higher
in 2010 than in any year since we began col-
lecting the statistic in 1975.
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Despite drastic increases in the number of
households in poverty, the effects of the
Great Recession on housing affordability
gaps are not straightforward. First, while
large reductions in income reduce the rents
that households can afford, poor employ-
ment prospects tend to delay household for-
mation. The number of households (owner
and renter), and their incomes, help deter-
mine demand – and thus price – for housing.
Lee and Painter (2013), looking historically
at recessions in the USA, find that a 1%
increase in the unemployment rate leads to a
1–2% decrease in the probability that an
individual will establish a renter household.
They find that household formation was
particularly low in the most recent recession,
when there was almost no growth in the
total number of US households from 2008
to 2010, whereas typical growth is 1% per
year (Lee and Painter, 2013).
However, although there were fewer
households forming, a greater proportion of
new and existing households were renters, as
the homeownership rate was in decline
because of foreclosures, economic uncer-
tainty, and reductions in mortgage credit.
Through these forces, the homeownership
rate declined to 66.5% in the first quarter of
2011, down from the first quarter 2005 peak
of 69.2%. This has continued to decline in
recent years, down to 64.4% in the third
quarter of 2014 (US Census Bureau, 2014).
Correspondingly, the Joint Center for
Housing Studies (2011) reported that renter
households increased by 3.4 million (roughly
10%) between 2004 and 2009.
On the supply side, the housing boom
oversupplied housing in most US markets.
And, the Joint Center for Housing Studies
(2011) noted that that rental vacancy rates
were up as backlogs of multifamily rental
developments were completed during and
after the Great Recession, leading some to
suggest that the Great Recession was good
for rental affordability (Capps, 2015).
However, although it is true that rental
vacancy rates tend to put downward pres-
sure on rents (Gabriel and Nothaft, 2001), it
is unclear whether the jump in vacancy rates
was high enough (from 9.8% in 2005 to
10.6% by 2009) to substantially affect rental
affordability. Furthermore, moving forward
from the Great Recession, the difficulty for
multifamily developers to obtain financing
for rental projects likely slowed the rate of
rental construction growth. In fact, the
rental vacancy rate has continued to decline
since the Great Recession, and in the first
quarter of 2016 was at its lowest point since
1986 (US Census Bureau, 2016).
A key reason these supply and demand
factors may not have reduced rents is
because it is well-known that prices for
rental housing are ‘sticky’, meaning we
should not expect the cost of rental housing
to decline quickly because of market condi-
tions. Ozimek (2013) points to the duration
of leases as the culprit, noting that data from
the American Housing Survey (AHS) report
that leases are for a year or more approxi-
mately 45% of the time. Genesove (2003)
found using annual AHS data from 1974 to
1981 (the last years for which we have
annual AHS data), that 29% of rents failed
to change in price from year to year. Ozimek
(2013) reports analyses from Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) data covering 1998 to
2011 that suggests rents are even stickier –
there was a 69% probability of no rent
change after six months and a 34% prob-
ability of no rent change after two years.
Thus, even in times of decreasing housing
demand because of lower purchasing power
and reduced household formation in most
markets, rents are unlikely to decrease
enough to affect housing affordability
indicators.
Public policy can also have an effect on
rental housing affordability, particularly
through housing subsidy programmes.
However, the three major federal rental
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housing programmes – Housing Choice
Vouchers (HCV), the Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit (LIHTC) and Public Housing –
are not designed as safety net programmes
where benefits and/or coverage increase in
times of need. And the fourth programme
under investigation in this paper – Section 8
New Construction – has not produced new
housing for years. There is no entitlement to
housing assistance. On the contrary, con-
struction through the LIHTC – by far the
largest programme that subsidises construc-
tion of new housing units – slowed during
the recession because of the difficulty of
finding credit for multifamily development
(Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2015).
Public housing was also declining in raw
numbers over this time period, particularly
via the HOPE VI demolition programme
(Goetz, 2013). Using HUD data, I calculate
that total housing vouchers utilised through
the programme increased by a modest 5.3%
from 2007 to 2010 (US Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 2016c).
In other words, these subsidy programmes
did not expand to an extent that would sta-
bilise housing costs for low-income and ELI
households.
Existing evidence on housing
affordability gaps
Given the above discussion on what might
happen to housing affordability during reces-
sions, what does available evidence tell us
about what did happen during the Great
Recession? Initial reports are quite worrisome.
The US Department of Housing and Urban
Development (2013) summarised data from
the American Housing Survey (AHS) and
reported that while the growth in the number
of households paying more than half of their
income to rent largely reflected steady popula-
tion growth throughout the country, those
numbers skyrocketed through the Great
Recession. Just over 5 million households had
such severe rental burdens in 2003, which
increased to nearly 6 million by 2007, but then
jumped to nearly 8.5 million by 2011. Thus,
while the number of severely rent-burdened
households increased 13% in the four years
preceding the Great Recession, there was a
44% increase in the subsequent four year
period (US Department of Housing and
Urban Development, 2013). It is important to
note that these are trends in household spend-
ing patterns that have been developing for
decades – households have been devoting a
greater share of their incomes to housing since
the 1960s. However, the leap in rent burdens
that occurred as a result of the Great
Recession was unprecedented.
Kroll (2013) presents post-recession data
on housing affordability according to three
different measures: ability to purchase a
home, share of income spent on housing,
and the income residual – the difference
between the amount spent on housing and
what is left over for spending on all other
goods. She found that renters and owners
in the USA experienced divergent trends in
the proportion of income that is spent on
housing. For owners with mortgages, the
percent of income spent on housing stayed
around 25% nationwide from 2005 to
2011, whereas the renter housing cost pro-
portion increased in 2009, 2010, and 2011 –
from roughly 30% to 32%. Furthermore,
Kroll finds dramatic increases in the pro-
portion of US renters paying 30% or more
of their income for housing. Similarly,
Bean (2012) highlights that rents increased
(3%) while median rental household
income declined (6%) from 2007 to 2010.
Bean also reported that from 2007 to 2010,
the proportion of households spending
30% or more on rent increased in all four
regions of the country and in rural, subur-
ban, and central city areas.
Data from the Joint Center (2013 ) corro-
borates many of these findings on house-
holds paying 30% or more of their income
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on rent, and provides additional data on
severely rent-burdened households (those
spending 50% of income or more). They
report that from 2000 to 2010, the propor-
tion of severely rent-burdened households
rose from 20% to 27% of all renter house-
holds, a rapid increase in such a short
amount of time. Colburn and Allen (2016)
use the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) and find that the per-
cent of severely rent-burdened households
jumped from 23% to 27% from 2005 to
2009. For low-income households, that
increase was from 69% to 77%.
MacDonald and Poethig (2014) look at
extremely low-income renters (ELI –
incomes at or below 30% of the Area
Median Income (AMI)). Using data in 2000
and 2012, they conclude that no county in
the nation has as enough affordable units to
house all of its ELI population.
What can housing subsidies do about
affordability?
As noted above, the major housing subsidy
programmes – housing vouchers, public
housing, LIHTC – are not entitlement pro-
grammes. As additional households slip into
poverty and qualify by income, more subsi-
dies do not typically become available
(although local subsidy numbers are not
fixed over time). Furthermore, housing sub-
sidies have limited reach into the low-income
population. As of the 2012 ACS, there were
28.3 million households in the bottom three
income categories (less than US$25,000) (US
Census Bureau, 2014). In comparison, HUD
reported 1.1 million active public housing
units, 2.2 million housing vouchers, fewer
than 800,000 Section 8 New Construction
units, and just under 2 million Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) units.2 There
are thus approximately 6 million total subsi-
dies, or less than one for every four lower
income households. However, this is an
overestimate, as voucher households often
live in LIHTC units. In Florida, for exam-
ple, Williamson et al. (2009) estimate that
approximately 16% of the state’s vouchers
are used in LIHTC units and that 10% of
LIHTC units are paid for using a housing
voucher. On the other hand, these subsidies
are tremendously important for those that
receive them. Horn et al. (2014) estimate that
the average voucher household with children
has an annual income around US$13,000
and the average value of their housing sub-
sidy is around US$8000 per year. In other
words, for participating families with chil-
dren, these benefits add approximately 60%
of post-tax income to the typical budget.
Not only do subsidy programmes fail to
respond to national economic conditions,
but localities have limited control over hous-
ing subsidy budgets, meaning these pro-
grammes are not particularly responsive to
changes in local housing markets. The size
of the public housing and voucher pro-
grammes are determined at the federal level
by Congressional appropriations to HUD.
The allocation of LIHTCs across cities and
counties is also formulaic. However, there is
substantial variation across metropolitan
areas and counties in terms of the propor-
tion of households using housing vouchers
and living in public housing. In fact, I calcu-
late that in 2010, just less than 6% of New
Orleans MSA households used a housing
voucher, compared with less than 1% of
households in the Sarasota-Bradenton, FL
MSA. Looking at public housing, just
under 5% of New York MSA households
live in public housing, compared with less
than 0.01% of households in the San Jose
MSA.
Much of the variation in the public hous-
ing programme is due to historical circum-
stances – the vast majority of public housing
was built prior to 1980, and over half was
built before 1969 (Orlebeke, 2000; Schwartz,
2010), meaning older metropolitan areas in
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the Northeast and Midwest built many more
public housing units during the mid-20th
century than did those in the South and
West. The other main factor is the HOPE
VI programme, which contributed substan-
tially to the 19% decline in the nation’s pub-
lic housing stock from 1994 to 2008
(Schwartz, 2010). There was substantial var-
iation in the extent to which HOPE VI
affected public housing stock across the
country. Goetz (2013) found wide variation
across cities – four cities (Hartford,
Memphis, St. Petersburg, and Detroit)
demolished more than half of their public
housing stock from 1990 to 2007 while
Providence and New York City demolished
less than 1% of their public housing stock
during that time.
There are many factors that affect the size
of a MSA or county voucher population.
First, HOPE VI may again be a factor, given
many jurisdictions replace some of these
demolished units with vouchers to displaced
households. It is also possible that voucher
numbers grow through increases in the utili-
sation rate. There are a number of ways in
which utilisation can increase, including bet-
ter targeting of subsidies to populations that
are more likely to use them, the implementa-
tion of Source of Income (SOI) laws
that prohibit discrimination by landlords
against using vouchers to pay for housing,
the effectiveness of local housing
authorities in connecting voucher holders to
housing, and more accessible rental markets.
Additionally, housing authorities can decide
whether they are going to provide deeper
subsidies to fewer households (i.e. the ELI
population and poorer) or smaller subsidies
to a larger group of households.
We might expect the individual housing
subsidy programmes to have differential
effects on affordability. O’Regan and Horn
(2013) report income levels for all four sub-
sidy groups under examination in this paper –
LIHTC, public housing, voucher, and
Section 8 New Construction for 18 states for
which they could obtain income data on
LIHTC households. They find that LIHTC
households are less poor than the households
receiving the other three subsidies.
Specifically, while between 74% (Section 8
NC) and 77% (public housing) of the three
non-LIHTC groups had incomes below 30%
AMI, only 45% of LIHTC households were
this poor. Given these income breakdowns,
we might expect public housing, voucher,
and Section 8 programmes to have the great-
est impact on affordability for ELI house-
holds, whereas the LIHTC would be more
likely to affect low-income household afford-
ability. It is important to note, lastly, that
these effects are not purely mechanical.
US$1 of government spending on LIHTC,
vouchers, or public housing does not neces-
sarily translate into US$1 less spent by a reci-
pient household on housing. There is strong
evidence that LIHTC crowds out private
construction (Eriksen and Rosenthal, 2010;
Malpezzi and Vandell, 2002) and that hous-
ing vouchers may raise the price of housing
for the unsubsidised (Eriksen and Ross,
2015; Susin, 2002). Therefore, it remains to
be seen how housing subsidies may affect
housing affordability.
Data and methods
Using data from the 2007 and 2010 waves of
the American Community Survey, I estimate
the trends in rental housing affordability for
different low-income and extremely low-
income households. Specifically, I calculate
the number of rental households that earn
30% and 50% of Area Median Income
(AMI), common benchmarks for extremely
low-income and low-income households,
respectively. Then, I match that demand to
supply – again using the ACS, I estimate the
number of rental units that exist in each
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market (counties and MSAs) that would be
affordable to those households in order to
analyse the extent to which each housing
market’s rental housing is matched to its
rental population in terms of affordability.3
My sample is each county and MSA with
population greater than 100,000. In Table
2a and 2b, I list the counties and MSAs,
respectively, that have the greatest and least
shortfalls of affordable rental units in 2007
and 2010. For the regression models (results
in Tables 3 through 5) I focus on counties,
in order to have a richer sample. There are
536 counties in the USA with population
greater than 100,000, and my regression
sample reduces to 505 in 2007 and 516 in
2010, almost entirely due to missing rental
data in the ACS. The vast majority of these
counties with missing data were smaller,
with population nearer to the 100,000 per-
son threshold. The sample of 536 counties
include 240.6 million people, 77% of the US
population.
To estimate these models, I add data from
HUD’s Picture of Subsidized Households
(US Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 2016b) to capture the preva-
lence of housing subsidies in each county.
This is a database of reports from local hous-
ing authorities to HUD on the number of
subsidies under their jurisdiction. This data-
base is regularly updated and includes data
across the country since 2000, at levels of
geography as small as the census tract and as
large as the country as a whole.
I use a number of measures to capture the
extent to which a housing market’s renter
population is housing cost-burdened. I begin
by counting the number of households below
30% and 50% of Area Median Income
(AMI) in each county. Then, I calculate the
number of rental units in US counties that
would be considered affordable to those
households. To do so, I use common thresh-
olds of rent burden (30% of income) and
severe rent burden (50% of income), and
produce four separate measures of the
affordable housing stock:
1. Rental units below 30% of income for
ELI households (earning 30% AMI or
less).
2. Rental units below 50% of income for
ELI households.
3. Rental units below 30% of income for
low-income households (earning 50%
AMI or less).
4. Rental units below 50% of income for
low-income households.
I use these measures, rather than the pro-
portion that households actually pay for
rent, for two reasons. First, these measures
allow me to observe the full menu of options
available to households, rather than the
choices they actually make. This way, I am
identifying what the market is providing,
rather than adding potential noise coming
from variation across areas in what people
choose to spend. Second, the ACS breaks
down rental housing costs as a percent of
household income using only seven income
categories, whereas I have 11 income cate-
gories when looking at the entire population
of renters. This allows me to more precisely
estimate the numbers of households below
30% and 50% AMI.
For each housing market (county and
MSA), I calculate the ratio between the
number of households in each AMI category
(30% and 50%) and the number of units
below each threshold, to identify the number
of households that exist per each unit that
those households can theoretically afford. I
compute each of these values in 2007 and
2010, and then calculate the change between
those years, to see what markets had the
greatest increases in rent burdens.
Using these variables, I estimate a set of
regression models that identify the housing
and demographic characteristics of coun-
ties – with particular attention to housing
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subsidies – that are most strongly associated
with higher rent burdens before and after
the Great Recession. These are OLS models
that take the following form:
RentHH
RentStocki
=a1+b1HCVi+b2LIHTCi
+b3PHi+Wdi+Dgi+Regioni+ ei
ð1Þ
where
RentHH
RentStocki
is the number of 30% AMI
rental households per rental housing unit that
would be affordable for those households.
HCVi, LIHTCi, and PHi are housing voucher,
LIHTC, and public housing households,
respectively, expressed as the proportion of
households receiving those subsidies in the
county. These data come from HUD’s Picture
of Subsidized Households (US Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 2016c), as
described above. I add a vector of housing
market variables (di) that have been shown to
affect house prices and in some cases rents.
The homeownership rate has been found to
be strongly related to house prices (Blackley
and Follain, 1991), and the vacancy rate
moves with the rental market (Gabriel and
Nothaft, 2001). These variables are all from
the American Community Survey. Owing to
the dynamics of the recent housing bust, I
include foreclosure estimates from 2008 to see
if areas with a high probability of foreclosure
are also where we see greater increases in
affordability problems. These data were
obtained from HUD4 (US Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 2016b).
Finally, given housing costs are in part a func-
tion of the income available to local residents,
I include demographic variables (gi: the pov-
erty rate, the percent White, and Area Median
Income (AMI), all obtained from the ACS). I
control for the region of the country in order
to pick up regional variation in rent burdens.
Cross-sectional models may be unable to
control for historical factors that might lead
to both a higher prevalence of subsidies and
greater numbers of low- and extremely low-
income households or higher rental housing
costs. For example, as noted, public housing
is disproportionately located in older coun-
ties, which often also have higher poverty
rates (though perhaps lower housing costs).
Further, the presence of public housing and
other subsidies in a city itself could attract
low-income households from neighbouring
jurisdictions. This is an important factor
when considering whether the observed rela-
tionships in this paper are indeed causal. To
the extent that low-income households move
to jurisdictions with greater subsidy availabil-
ity (or leave jurisdictions with less availabil-
ity), this would create a two-way relationship
between housing subsidies and competition
for low-cost rental housing. In a cross-
sectional model, we would thus be more
likely – all else equal – to see a positive rela-
tionship between housing subsidy prevalence
and the competition for low-cost housing. In
other words, we would be more likely to con-
clude that housing subsidies make housing
less affordable. Annual data can limit the
extent that this is a problem, as we have little
reason to believe that low-income households
are able to anticipate year-on-year reductions
in the availability of housing subsidies fast
enough to make a move that would show up
in the data. However, households may
respond to increased housing affordability
and poverty problems by being more likely
to use the subsidies that they are granted. To
the extent this occurs, this would capture an
important role that housing subsidies can
play – hardship leads to increased uptake of
the subsidy, which then reduces hardship.
Furthermore, while localities have limited
resources to increase housing subsidies in
response to housing market conditions on
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an annual basis, they may be able to influ-
ence HUD to provide additional funds or
subsidies over a longer time horizon. Given
these historical factors that may lead to
spurious correlations, longitudinal data
improves our ability to isolate the effects of
housing subsidy programmes on affordabil-
ity. Accordingly, I construct a panel data set
annually for the years 2005 to 2012. I focus
on this time period both to include years
before, during, and after the Great
Recession and because the ACS begins pro-
viding annual estimates in 2005. Using these
data, I run a set of fixed effects regression
models that control for time-invariant char-
acteristics of counties in addition to the
above demographic and housing variables
also measured annually, excluding the fore-
closure rate and regulatory index variables,
as those are only available in one year. With
annual data, we can be more confident that
observed effects are due to actual impacts
that housing subsidies are having on housing
affordability, and not the other way around.
These models offer a more robust specifica-
tion of the relationship between housing
subsidies and affordability.
The best argument that a relationship
between housing subsidy prevalence and
affordability using annual data is likely cau-
sal is that – as noted – counties do not have
much control over the size of their subsidy
portfolios from year to year. However, to
the extent that counties and housing authori-
ties can make these changes, this would bias
toward a positive relationship between sub-
sidy numbers and affordability problems.
However, housing authorities can tweak the
number of households served (which I can
measure) by making the average subsidy
more or less generous (which I cannot mea-
sure). In some communities, for example,
growing problems with homelessness and
deep poverty may lead housing authorities
to provide larger subsidies to a smaller group
of households. To the extent this occurred,
this could bias toward a negative relation-
ship between subsidy numbers and afford-
ability problems.
Results
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for
selected variables for the 536 counties with
2005 population greater than 100,000. In
2007, the average county had 2.9 ELI house-
holds per rental unit that would consume
30% or less of the income of those house-
holds. In other words, for every rental unit
that would be deemed affordable to an ELI
household there are nearly three households
competing for that housing unit. In 2010, that
number climbed to 3.3 households per unit.
For low-income renter households
(incomes less than 50% AMI), there were
1.2 households per rental unit at a 30%
income threshold, and that ratio held steady
(1.3) between 2007 and 2010. Looking at the
50% income threshold, there were just
slightly more rental units at or below these
price thresholds for both populations –
those earning less than 30% and 50% AMI.
In 2007, there were 0.7 ELI households for
each rental unit priced below a 50% income
threshold for that population, which held
steady (0.8 households per unit) in 2010. In
the average county, we could thus expect that
a unit below that 50% threshold would exist
for each household. However, that is a very
high threshold that does not leave much
income for transportation, food, child care,
and the myriad other expenses that they face.
The wide differences between rent bur-
dens across the country are displayed in
Table 2. Here, I list the top ten MSAs and
counties with the highest and lowest rent
burden ratios in 2007 and 2010, along with
the top ten in terms of greatest increase and
decrease in rent burden ratios. Table 2a lists
the counties and 2b lists the MSAs. In
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Figure 1, I provide a map to better visualise
the concentration of high cost-burdened
counties across the country.
The differences between the least and
most affordable counties and MSAs are quite
large. In the least affordable markets, there
are about 1.5 to 2 ELI rental households
competing for a unit that costs half their
household income. In the most affordable
markets, that ratio is flipped – there are over
2 units available (albeit at a high-budget cost
threshold) for each ELI rental household.
Many high housing-cost-burdened MSAs
and counties are in the parts of the country
where we would expect them to be – along
the coasts and in areas of high poverty. The
counties with the highest ratio of rental ELI
households to rental units available at 50%
or lower of that income level are almost all
located in Florida – that holds in 2007 (when
eight of ten were located in Florida) and
2010 (seven of ten in Florida). Using that
metric at the MSA level, five of seven
Florida MSAs are in the top ten in 2007, and
three of the seven Florida MSAs are in the
top ten in 2010. Florida counties comprise
seven of the top ten least affordable counties
in the country in both 2007 and 2010. Given
the fact that the AMI thresholds vary across
counties and should control somewhat for
the high cost of housing, the concentration
in particular areas of the country is striking.
There is a strong confluence of poverty and
high housing costs in Florida that is driving
these numbers. Poverty appears to drive
these numbers as much as high housing costs
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the 536 largest counties.
Mean SD Min Max
30% AMI Renters per unit at 30% of income, 2010 3.3 1.5 1.0 14.0
30% AMI Renters per unit at 50% of income, 2010 0.8 0.3 0.3 2.1
50% AMI Renters per unit at 30% of income, 2010 1.3 0.4 0.7 3.6
50% AMI Renters per unit at 50% of income, 2010 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.9
30% AMI Renters per unit at 30% of income, 2007 2.9 1.4 0.9 13.4
30% AMI Renters per unit at 50% of income, 2007 0.7 0.2 0.3 2.1
50% AMI Renters per unit at 30% of income, 2007 1.2 0.4 0.7 4.1
50% AMI Renters per unit at 50% of income, 2007 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.9
% change in Rent HHs below 30% AMI for each unit at
30% of income 2007–2010
17.4% 41.7% 258.0% 395.0%
% change in Rent HHs below 30% AMI for each unit at
50% of income 2007–2010
11.2% 23.4% 257.0% 164.0%
% change in Rent HHs below 50% AMI for each unit at
30% of income 2007–2010
6.9% 19.6% 260.0% 107.0%
% change in Rent HHs below 50% AMI for each unit at
50% of income 2007–2010
8.8% 11.3% 228.0% 57.0%
Public Housing units per HH – 2010 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.083
HCV units per HH – 2010 0.017 0.011 0.000 0.112
LIHTC units per HH – 2010 0.015 0.010 0.000 0.072
Public Housing units per HH – 2007 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.080
HCV units per HH – 2007 0.016 0.010 0.000 0.093
LIHTC units per HH – 2007 0.015 0.010 0.001 0.069
% change in PH units per hhold, 2007–2010 21.1% 43.3% 21.9% 422.0%
% change in Voucher units per hhold, 2007–2011 9.0% 37.5% 242.0% 422.0%
% change in LIHTC units per hhold, 2007–2012 1.4% 26.9% 286.0% 224.0%
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Figure 1. Map of 536 US counties: Ratio of households earning 30% AMI to units affordable at 30% of
income (2010).
Table 2. (a) Top ten counties with the highest and lowest cost burden ratios in 2007 and 2010. Ratio of
households at or below 30% AMI to units available at 50% of income.
Most cost-burdened 2007 Most cost-burdened 2010 Biggest increase in cost
burdens
Seminole County, FL 2.1 Osceola County, FL 2.1 Deschutes County, OR 164%
Broward County, FL 1.8 Los Angeles County, CA 2.1 Franklin County, PA 111%
Palm Beach County, FL 1.7 Queens County, NY 1.9 Navajo County, AZ 109%
Collier County, FL 1.7 Orange County, FL 1.9 Onslow County, NC 93%
Miami-Dade County, FL 1.7 Citrus County, FL 1.8 Iredell County, NC 87%
Hidalgo County, TX 1.7 Miami-Dade County, FL 1.7 Indian River County, FL 83%
Orleans Parish, LA 1.6 Leon County, FL 1.6 Shelby County, AL 82%
Osceola County, FL 1.6 Charlotte County, FL 1.6 Lexington County, SC 79%
Volusia County, FL 1.6 Alachua County, FL 1.6 Boone County, KY 76%
Okaloosa County, FL 1.5 Hidalgo County, TX 1.5 Lake County, FL 70%
Least cost-burdened 2007 Least cost-burdened 2010 Biggest decrease in cost
burdens
Franklin County, PA 0.3 Sheboygan County, WI 0.3 Collier County, FL 57%
Boone County, KY 0.4 Washington County, WI 0.4 Clark County, NV 39%
Cumberland County, PA 0.4 Richland County, OH 0.4 Terrebonne Parish, LA 38%
Johnson County, KS 0.4 Winnebago County, WI 0.4 Clackamas County, OR 35%
Anoka County, MN 0.4 Brown County, WI 0.4 Washington County, OR 35%
Washington County, WI 0.4 Sarpy County, NE 0.4 Warren County, OH 34%
Clay County, MO 0.4 Cass County, ND 0.4 Nueces County, TX 34%
Sheboygan County, WI 0.4 Minnehaha County, SD 0.4 Denton County, TX 30%
Richland County, OH 0.4 Wright County, MN 0.4 Palm Beach County, FL 30%
Ottawa County, MI 0.4 Polk County, IA 0.5 Okaloosa County, FL 29%
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– despite the variability of the AMI num-
bers, the non-Florida counties and MSAs
are just as likely to be in areas of the country
with high poverty (the deep South) as high-
cost areas such as California and New York.
Looking at changes from 2007 to 2010,
there is consistency between the two years in
terms of the MSAs and counties with the
highest rent burdens. But there was a lot of
change in these indicators for such a short
amount of time. The average county had a
17% increase in the ratio between rental ELI
households and the number of units priced at
or below 30% of income. For 30% AMI and
Table 2. (b) Top ten MSAs with the highest and lowest cost burden ratios in 2007 and 2010. Ratio of
households at or below 30% AMI to units available at 50% of income.
Most cost-burdened 2007 Most cost-burdened 2010 Biggest increase in cost
burdens
Fort Lauderdale, FL 1.8 Los Angeles–Long Beach,
CA
2.1 Wilmington–Newark,
DE–MD
78%
Baton Rouge, LA 1.7 Orlando, FL 1.8 Allentown–Bethlehem–
Easton, PA
74%
West Palm Beach–Boca
Raton, FL
1.7 Miami, FL 1.7 Norfolk–Virginia Beach–
Newport News, VA–NC
60%
Miami, FL 1.7 McAllen–Edinburg–
Mission,TX
1.5 Los Angeles–Long Beach,
CA
59%
McAllen–Edinburg–
Mission,TX
1.7 New York, NY 1.5 Columbia, SC 55%
Memphis,TN–AR–MS 1.6 Fort Lauderdale, FL 1.4 Charleston–North
Charleston, SC
51%
Orlando, FL 1.3 New Orleans, LA 1.4 Wichita, KS 38%
Las Vegas, NV–AZ 1.3 Charleston–North
Charleston, SC
1.3 Albuquerque, NM 38%
Los Angeles–Long Beach,
CA
1.3 Birmingham, AL 1.3 Orlando, FL 38%
Tampa–St. Petersburg–
Clearwater, FL
1.3 Baton Rouge, LA 1.2 Birmingham, AL 36%
Least cost-burdened 2007 Least cost-burdened 2010 Biggest decrease in cost
burdens
Harrisburg–Lebanon–
Carlisle, PA
0.4 Fort Wayne, IN 0.5 Memphis, TN–AR–MS 40%
Fort Wayne, IN 0.5 Omaha, NE–IA 0.5 Las Vegas, NV–AZ 39%
Wichita, KS 0.5 Raleigh–Durham–Chapel
Hill, NC
0.5 West Palm Beach–Boca
Raton, FL
30%
Raleigh–Durham–Chapel
Hill, NC
0.5 Harrisburg–Lebanon–
Carlisle, PA
0.5 Baton Rouge, LA 26%
Kansas City, MO–KS 0.5 AnnArbor, MI 0.6 San Antonio, TX 23%
Colorado Springs, CO 0.5 Colorado Springs, CO 0.6 Dallas,TX 22%
Omaha, NE–IA 0.5 Kansas City, MO–KS 0.6 Cleveland–Lorain–Elyria,
OH
21%
Oklahoma City, OK 0.5 Columbus, OH 0.6 Ann Arbor, MI 21%
Grand Rapids–Muskegon–
Holland, MI
0.6 Salt Lake City–Ogden, UT 0.6 Fort Lauderdale, FL 21%
Milwaukee–Waukesha,
WI
0.6 Fort Worth–Arlington,TX 0.6 Portland–Vancouver, OR–
WA
20%
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50% income, there was an 11% increase.
Further, some rental housing markets were
acutely affected by the Great Recession. Five
metros (Table 2b) – Wilmington–Newark,
DE–MD, Allentown–Bethlehem–Easton, PA,
Norfolk–Virginia Beach–Newport News,
VA–NC, Orlando, FL, and Tulsa, OK had
increases of 60% or more in the number of
ELI households per rental housing unit at the
30% income threshold, 50% income thresh-
old, or both. The county-level changes were
very high in some cases. In several counties,
the number of ELI households for each rental
unit at or below 30% of income doubled in
three years. Looking at the data, it is not
obvious why such dramatic changes occurred
in these areas. Poverty rates increased signifi-
cantly in many of the counties with big
changes toward reduced affordability, and the
vacancy rate decreased in some of these areas.
In the areas that became more affordable, the
poverty rates held steady or increased, while
many had significant declines in the vacancy
rate. The most predictive factors, then, seem
to be strong increases in the poverty rate
(which occurred nationwide during the Great
Recession), along with a tightening in the
housing market.
Table 3 contains first set of results that
attempts to explain these substantial varia-
tions in housing affordability, with specific
attention to the role of housing subsidies.
The four dependent variables are as
described in section ‘Data and methods’
(each household type with housing afford-
ability defined as 30% or 50% of household
income). The models in Table 3 focus on the
county sample at the onset of the recession
in 2007. Table 4 replicates these models at
the tail end of the recession, in 2010.
In the 2007 results, there is a strong pub-
lic housing and Section 8 New Construction
effect at the 30% of income threshold. The
LIHTC effect is restricted to the 50% of
household income threshold. Each of these
coefficients makes theoretical sense given the
particularly low incomes of public housing
tenants (see footnote 2), that public housing
rents are set at 30% of monthly income,5
and that LIHTC income targeting is more
flexible. The coefficient on the public hous-
ing variable appears large (for an additional
public housing unit per household we
observe a decrease in 51.25 households
below 30% AMI competing for affordable
units), but evaluated at feasible public hous-
ing per household numbers, these effects are
plausible. The effect of a one standard devia-
tion increase in public housing units per
household (0.009) is a decrease of 0.46 30%
AMI households competing for housing at
the 30% threshold. Other variables that
appear to reduce the competition for afford-
able units at the 30% AMI, 30% income
threshold include the homeownership rate,
percent non-Hispanic White, median
income, and living in the Midwest region.
Variables that have the opposite effect are
the foreclosure rate (potentially increasing
competition for rental units), the Percent
with a BA, and living in the South. It is
important to note the consistency with
which foreclosure rates are connected to
greater affordability problems – this is
observed in seven of eight models.
For the other dependent variables in col-
umns two to four, public housing prevalence
is again strongly associated with lower com-
petition for units at the 30% income thresh-
old, this time for households earning 50% of
AMI. LIHTC units have a significant effect
on affordability for the 50% AMI house-
holds at the 50% affordability threshold.
This is not surprising, given LIHTC units
add to the housing stock yet the affordabil-
ity restrictions apply to only a fraction of
the units.6
In 2010, the observed relationships for
the housing and demographic variables are
largely repeated from the 2007 models.
However, the housing subsidy results are dif-
ferent in important ways. The main public
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housing result – 30% AMI and 30% of
income – holds, but public housing no lon-
ger appears to reduce affordability problems
for 50% AMI households and is associated
with increased affordability problems for the
50% AMI group at the 50% income thresh-
old. Given public housing should not have
as much of an effect on this income group,
this could be evidence suggesting a crowd-
out effect from public housing on the private
market. But this result is not robust – it is
not observed in the 2007 models nor in the
models using panel data. The coefficient on
housing vouchers nearly reached statistical
significance in the 2007 model for the 30%
of AMI population at the 30% cost thresh-
old (t = 21.90), and in the 2010 model is
strongly associated with reduced rent bur-
dens at the 1% level. The coefficient on
housing vouchers is about one-third the size
Table 3. Cross-section regression results, 2007.
30% AMI,
30% of income
30% AMI,
50% of income
50% AMI, 30%
of income
50% AMI,
50% of income
Public housing per HH 251.25*** 21.072 24.949** 0.385
(8.492) (1.285) (2.206) (0.424)
HCV per HH 213.40* 1.021 20.512 0.539
(7.048) (1.136) (2.064) (0.382)
LIHTC per HH 21.059 23.334** 23.009 21.127***
(6.559) (1.338) (2.465) (0.317)
Section 8 NC per HH 240.95*** 22.370 27.232* 1.228*
(12.33) (2.759) (4.258) (0.731)
2008 foreclosure rate 13.02*** 3.524*** 6.867*** 0.420**
(3.812) (0.710) (1.290) (0.205)
Homeownership rate 23.420*** 20.137 20.729** 0.197***
(1.126) (0.196) (0.337) (0.0570)
Ln(Population) 0.0336 0.0193 0.0324 20.00185
(0.102) (0.0160) (0.0273) (0.00435)
Percent poverty 20.764 0.144 22.063*** 1.379***
(1.934) (0.351) (0.618) (0.117)
Percent BA 3.905*** 0.719*** 1.202*** 0.0831*
(0.999) (0.164) (0.283) (0.0499)
Percent White 21.485** 20.255*** 20.542*** 0.0465
(0.601) (0.0898) (0.149) (0.0312)
Area Median Income 20.0223*** 20.00392*** 20.0115*** 0.00293***
(0.00750) (0.00142) (0.00234) (0.000498)
Percent vacant 1.494 1.165*** 2.315*** 0.244***
(1.425) (0.239) (0.427) (0.0780)
Midwest 20.491*** 20.118*** 20.219*** 0.00394
(0.141) (0.0275) (0.0466) (0.00859)
South 0.425*** 0.000353 0.0259 20.0270***
(0.156) (0.0315) (0.0508) (0.0103)
West 20.349 20.0136 0.0111 20.0157
(0.241) (0.0392) (0.0680) (0.0101)
Constant 6.555*** 0.585* 1.966*** 0.0451
(2.051) (0.305) (0.544) (0.0878)
Observations 505 505 505 505
Adjusted R2 0.408 0.358 0.435 0.438
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p\ 0.01, **p\ 0.05, *p\ 0.1
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of that on public housing. As we will see,
this result holds in the panel data model.
The significant LIHTC results from 2007 are
no longer significant in 2010, and are not
significant in the panel model.
The panel data regression results offer the
strongest controls for idiosyncrasies between
different counties that do not vary over time
and may be correlated with housing afford-
ability and housing subsidy activity. Table 5
displays these results, which are different in
important ways from the cross-section mod-
els. Public housing prevalence is no longer
associated with reduced rent burdens for the
30% AMI group at the 30% income thresh-
old – or any of the other measures of afford-
ability. The only housing subsidy variable
that appears to reduce rent burdens is hous-
ing vouchers per household. The coefficient
of 29.05 suggests that a one standard
Table 4. Cross-section regression results, 2010.
30% AMI,
30% of income
30% AMI,
50% of income
50% AMI,
30% of income
50% AMI,
50% of income
Public housing per HH 254.31*** 21.061 23.724 1.223***
(9.573) (1.604) (2.670) (0.465)
HCV per HH 219.01*** 1.627 0.342 0.381
(7.261) (1.171) (2.037) (0.297)
LIHTC per HH 1.821 22.352* 23.118 20.383
(8.509) (1.245) (2.036) (0.275)
Section 8 NC per HH 268.26*** 24.741** 28.110** 0.534
(13.36) (2.217) (3.622) (0.639)
2008 foreclosure rate 23.49*** 3.353*** 5.834*** 0.360*
(4.378) (0.592) (0.944) (0.192)
Homeownership rate 25.054*** 20.0379 20.272 0.343***
(1.321) (0.230) (0.391) (0.0551)
Ln(Population) 0.0290 0.0127 0.0218 0.00172
(0.0871) (0.0206) (0.0335) (0.00434)
Percent poverty 1.140 0.514 20.911 1.264***
(2.021) (0.397) (0.635) (0.110)
Percent BA 4.196*** 0.688*** 1.036*** 0.0215
(1.004) (0.166) (0.263) (0.0443)
Percent White 0.0598 20.251*** 20.611*** 0.0392
(0.447) (0.0865) (0.141) (0.0295)
Area Median Income 20.0223*** 20.00479*** 20.0120*** 0.00229***
(0.00672) (0.00133) (0.00220) (0.000375)
Percent vacant 2.516* 1.131*** 1.922*** 0.0792
(1.337) (0.206) (0.318) (0.0696)
Midwest 20.702*** 20.169*** 20.262*** 20.0113
(0.155) (0.0249) (0.0384) (0.00789)
South 0.515*** 20.0375 20.0295 20.0387***
(0.153) (0.0341) (0.0544) (0.00955)
West 20.326 20.0298 0.00366 20.0134
(0.219) (0.0432) (0.0714) (0.0106)
Constant 6.298*** 0.698** 1.976*** 0.00344
(2.029) (0.348) (0.592) (0.0873)
Observations 516 516 516 516
Adjusted R2 0.453 0.416 0.439 0.445
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p\ 0.01, **p\ 0.05, *p\ 0.1.
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deviation increase (0.01) in housing vouchers
per household would lead to a decrease of
0.01 households below 30% AMI competing
for affordable housing units. This is a rather
small effect – the mean is 3.1, and this effect
is about 0.3% of that. Among the control
variables, the percent poverty and percent
vacant are positively associated with
affordability problems – the vacancy coeffi-
cients there are unexpected, although
research is mixed on the relationship
between vacancy and rents (Eubank and
Sirmans, 1979; Gabriel and Nothaft, 2001).
As in the cross-sectional models, AMI is
negatively associated with the first three
affordability measures, and positively
associated with affordability at the 50%
income threshold for 50% AMI households.
Across the three sets of models, the most
consistent housing subsidy effect is from
housing vouchers for households earning
30% income, using the 30% cost threshold.
For public housing, this effect is only in the
cross-section models. It is important to note
that the significant coefficients on the public
housing and housing voucher variables are
observed in connection to the dependent
variable that we would expect to be most
affected by these subsidies – the 30% AMI
population is the target for these subsidies,
and rent for public housing and voucher
families typically cannot exceed 30% of
Table 5. Panel data regression results, 2005–2012.
30% AMI,
30% of income
30%,
50% of income
50% AMI,
30% of income
50% AMI,
50% of income
Public housing per HH 212.57 0.158 20.935 1.113
(10.57) (2.299) (3.810) (0.800)
HCV per HH 29.053** 0.989 0.847 20.333
(3.709) (0.679) (1.065) (0.241)
LIHTC per HH 20.130 20.816 22.027 0.323
(7.573) (1.313) (2.373) (0.378)
Section 8 NC per HH 21.256 20.958 0.0199 0.938
(11.30) (2.326) (3.784) (0.780)
Percent BA 1.158 0.0223 20.101 20.0768
(1.426) (0.184) (0.269) (0.0600)
Percent White 22.824 20.00152 0.0398 20.0894
(3.540) (0.396) (0.655) (0.0997)
Percent homeowner 21.744 0.0453 20.263 0.199***
(1.249) (0.152) (0.257) (0.0564)
Percent poverty 5.464*** 1.692*** 1.243*** 1.039***
(1.619) (0.180) (0.280) (0.0578)
Area Median Income 20.0580*** 20.0109*** 20.0208*** 0.00389***
(0.0120) (0.00165) (0.00277) (0.000539)
Percent vacant 3.638*** 0.463** 0.651** 0.214***
(1.374) (0.198) (0.312) (0.0610)
Constant 9.124*** 1.177*** 2.623*** 0.142
(3.159) (0.351) (0.597) (0.0906)
Observations 4,069 4,069 4,069 4,069
Adjusted R2 0.119 0.226 0.174 0.318
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p\ 0.01, **p\ 0.05, *p\ 0.1.
All models include Region–Year interactions to control for time trends within each of the nine Census regions.
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household income. Given this is the afford-
ability measure that public housing and vou-
chers should most directly effect, it is an
intriguing result that this is where we observe
the effect, and the lack of effects on other
affordability measures can be considered a
successful falsification test. If the results held
in the other models, that would be evidence
for omitted variables that were correlated
with both public housing and/or voucher
prevalence and affordability problems.
However, these effects are not fully consis-
tent across all models, and must still be con-
sidered suggestive evidence.
Discussion
There is ample evidence to support the grow-
ing concern over rental housing affordability
in US urban areas. I estimate there are more
than three extremely low-income households
for every rental unit that would be consid-
ered affordable (at the 30% threshold) for
such households. There is nearly a one to
one ratio between the number of ELI house-
holds and the number of rental properties
that are priced at 50% of that income.
The decline in incomes during the Great
Recession (at the low end of the distribution)
was clearly more substantial than decreases
in rents resulting from the housing market
collapse. Further, many areas are particu-
larly rent burdened. Across the sample of
counties, the range of ratios of extremely
low-income households to rental units
affordable to that population (at 30% of
income – tables available upon request)
ranges from 0.9 to 13.4 – an ELI family finds
it more than 13 times as difficult to find an
affordable unit in Clayton County, GA (part
of the Atlanta metropolitan area) as in Linn
County, IA. Some of these variations are not
quite as one would expect. Rental housing
unaffordability is much more pronounced in
Florida and other areas of the South. While
Florida’s housing affordability problems are
no secret, the Houston, Atlanta, and Baton
Rouge metropolitan areas on the top ten lists
are noteworthy surprises, whereas markets
such as Boston and San Francisco appear in
2007 and 2010 on the list of MSAs where there
is a lower ratio of very low-income households
to affordable rental properties. Perhaps the
poor have largely left these markets because of
the lack of affordable rental opportunities.
The analyses in this paper suggest that
public housing and vouchers may be effec-
tive in reducing rent burdens for ELI house-
holds, but these results were not fully
consistent across all models. It may be the
case that a more responsive housing subsidy
policy – in which low-income households
could quickly obtain assistance to address
their needs – would have a greater effect.
Housing subsidies do change in prevalence
from year to year (year-on-year change in
housing vouchers per capita in the 75th per-
centile county was a robust 5.7%), but not
in systematic response to affordability prob-
lems. An experiment in which HUD
authorised a set of housing authorities to be
more responsive to local housing subsidy
demand would allow us to more precisely
observe the effects of housing subsidies on
affordability. I do observe effects from pub-
lic housing and vouchers on the affordability
measure with the clearest link to these subsi-
dies – 30% AMI households, with the cost
threshold at 30% of income.
There are further realities that complicate
our ability to estimate a relationship between
the various housing subsidies and affordabil-
ity. The LIHTC programme (and Section 8
New Construction, although it currently cre-
ates no new housing) should contribute to
the housing supply, but the LIHTC is able to
target higher income households (up to 60%
AMI – see footnote6). For housing vouchers,
the data may further impede our ability to
tease out the effects of this programme. In
the ACS, respondents are supposed to
‘report the rent agreed to or contracted for
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even if paid by someone else such as friends
or relatives living elsewhere, a church or wel-
fare agency, or the government through sub-
sidies or vouchers’ (US Census Bureau,
2010). While there is plenty of reason to
believe that households report what they pay
(contract rent minus any subsidies), we do
not truly know whether this is the case.7
Voucher effects may be hard to detect
because voucher households are not sup-
posed to subtract out the value of the vou-
cher in reporting rents.
Local housing authorities do have some
power in determining the size of their sub-
sidy populations, chiefly through decisions
about targeting. Housing authorities have
flexibility in whether they choose to provide
deeper subsidies to fewer households (i.e. the
ELI population and poorer) or smaller sub-
sidies to a larger group of households. If they
choose to provide smaller subsidies to more
households, their numbers would increase.
We know very little about how these target-
ing decisions affect affordability on a larger
scale.
In a more ideal world for housing afford-
ability, housing authorities would not neces-
sarily have to choose between funding the
extremely poor and the very poor. The
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
(CBPP) estimates that one in four families
that qualify for rental assistance actually
receive it (Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, 2013). Additional flexibility about
the types of subsidy would also potentially
make these subsidies more effective. Tighter
housing markets should build more and
make more use of the LIHTC, whereas
higher poverty areas with a lot of supply
should utilise more vouchers.
The analyses in this paper confirm that
the rental affordability problem is getting
worse for low-income households, housing
subsidies are not growing at the same rate as
this problem, and these subsidies have the
potential to alleviate these problems for
extremely low-income households. However,
the country’s public housing stock is shrink-
ing, the voucher programme has stagnated,
subsidies on Section 8 and LIHTC develop-
ments are expiring, and there is very little
political will to reverse these trends.
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Notes
1. The Business Cycle Dating Committee of the
National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) identifies business cycle peaks and
troughs, and pinpoint December 2007 as the
peak of the Great Recession, with June 2009
as the trough. I use 2007 as the last year of
pre-recession data and 2010 as the first year
of post-recession data.
2. Author’s tabulation of HUD Picture of
Subsidized Household data (US Department
of Housing and Urban Development, 2016b).
3. Note that the affordability threshold is calcu-
lated for those earning the maximum ELI
wage. For example, if 30% AMI is US$10,000,
I determine a unit to be affordable if the rent is
US$250 per month or less (US$10,000/12
(months) 3 0.30 = US$250 per month).
Thus, this may be an overestimate of the num-
ber of affordable housing units, since
US$10,000 is the most that an ELI household
can make and still afford that rent, and I
assume that rents are more clustered near the
affordability threshold than incomes are (i.e.
few rents are very low, but incomes often are).
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4. These numbers are an approximation of
county-level foreclosure starts. HUD begins
with state-level foreclosure starts identified by
the Mortgage Bankers Association through a
survey and distributes the state numbers to
counties based on county-level variables that
are correlated with foreclosure.
5. See US Department of Housing and Urban
Development (2016a) at http://portal.hud.
gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/rental_assis
tance/phprog.
6. Developers utilise the credits under one of
two conditions: that 20% of the units are to
be affordable to households with incomes at
or below 50% of AMI; or that 40% are
affordable to households below 60% of AMI
(O’Regan and Horn, 2013). In practice, many
developments are entirely comprised of units
at prices affordable to 60% AMI households
(McClure, 2006).
7. Conversations with individuals at HUD and
the Census Bureau suggest this is a plausible
explanation. In fact, HUD personnel have
examined American Housing Survey data
and found that over half the time, households
with housing subsidies report the contract
rent minus the value of the subsidy rather
than the entire contract rent, as directed by
the question.
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